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Introduction 
As the military conflict for Iraq concluded, a new battle began over the best way to rebuild the Iraqi 
economy. On the one side are those who believe that, by establishing proper institutions and rules, the 
Iraqis will be able to rebuild their own economy without an extended period of outside oversight and 
massive financial assistance. Another side sees the necessity of substantial infusions of foreign 
assistance and technical support over an extended period of time. A possible third group primarily led by 
the French and Russians feels that a new Iraqi government should set a high priority on paying back the 
tens of billions of dollars in loans taken by Saddam's government (Rahn 2003). While differing somewhat 
on ends and means, no doubt all sides would agree that any recovery of the Iraqi economy will entail 
successfully addressing a daunting set of tasks: 
• Repairing a wrecked and neglected banking system that currently has at least three currencies in 
circulation: "Swiss" dinars," "Saadam" dinars, and now U.S. dollars.  
• Beginning servicing and restructuring of the country's massive national debt.  
• Resurrecting a whole spectrum of dilapidated industries.  
• Revitalizing a declining and neglected agricultural sector.  
• Propelling an economy based largely on cash, barter and international assistance into the 21st 
century.  
• Reestablishing a consuming middle class that has all but disappeared.  
• Diversifying an economy that currently depends upon a single commodity, oil.  
• Replacing graft and corruption with a streamlined government that can collect taxes and enforce 
contracts.  
• Commencing privatizing of inefficient public enterprises.  
Although forging the country's economic recovery will be a daunting task, a number of lessons are 
apparent from the experiences of former-Soviet-block countries, as well as the reform programs of many 
of the formerly inward-oriented Latin American economies. Over the last several decades, more than a 
dozen countries, ranging from Chile to Poland, have gone through a transition from stagnant socialist to 
vibrant free-market democratic economies. Although each of these countries is unique in many regards, 
there are enough similarities to provide a rough understanding of what works and what doesn't. 
Uppermost is the establishment of the rule of law, an honest court system, and the protection of private 
property. Those formerly socialist countries that continued to have a corrupt and uncertain judicial system 
have had poor economic performance despite considerable economic reform. If private property rights 
are not protected, few will invest (Economist, "Rebuilding Iraq" April 17, 2003).  
Another lesson learned from the transition economy experience is that progress will be difficult without the 
creation of a sound monetary system. Iraq has suffered very high rates of inflation in recent years but, 
given the oil wealth of the country, a sound currency could be quickly created. One obvious solution is to 
simply dollarize (or even euroize) the economy (Hanke, 2003). This could be done even before the 
creation of a new central bank. Specifically, simply let the dollar (or euro) circulate as the principal means 
of payment, with the money supply, as in the old gold standard, ultimately determined by the country's 
balance of payments position.  
Several countries including Panama, Ecuador and El Salvador currently use the dollar as their official 
currency. Another alternative would be the creation of a new Iraqi dinar. Here a set of follow-on issues 
entail: (a) what rules should be used by an Iraqi Central Bank in issuing new dinars? and (b) how should 
the exchange rate be set with regard to other currencies? The sections below focus on these issues in an 
attempt to identify the best monetary system for facilitating Iraq's reconstruction, restructuring, and future 
economic growth.  
Situation Immediately Following the End of the Conflict 
The country's twenty-four million people are currently struggling to subsist in an economy based largely 
on cash, barter and international handouts. As Veith (April 12, 2003) notes "The nation is hobbled by high 
unemployment, poverty, spiraling inflation, and rampant corruption. Its middle class has all but 
disappeared. Taxes go uncollected, contracts unpaid. Agriculture has withered and other industries have 
collapsed. There are no official budgets or economic statistics. The government depends almost wholly 
on exports of a single commodity, petroleum, subject to sharp price swings." 
Of particular concern is the country's external debt. While a precise figure is unavailable, the country's 
external financial obligations consist roughly of: $127 billion in debt, $57 billion in pending contracts 
(mostly with Russian companies), and $27 billion in compensation due to victims of the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. Debts to Kuwait are estimated at around $17 billion, to other Gulf States $30 billion, and to 
Russia around $12 billion (Stelzer 1993). 
Another problem area is the country's entire financial system. Baghdad's financial district is a mass of 
blown-out vaults, burned-out buildings, and broken glass. All nine floors of the Iraqi Central Bank have 
collapsed into a hollow shell.  
Decades ago, Iraq's financial system was one of the region's most modern; its pool of well-educated 
technocrats helped other Middle Eastern countries, such as Jordan, establish their central banks. 
Unfortunately, the system was run into the ground by Saddam Hussein, who treated the Central Bank as 
his own private account. Under Hussein, the Bank lost its independent power to regulate exchange rates 
and interest rates.  
Before the war, there were a few private banks, but the system was dominated by four state-run lenders. 
Baath Party loyalists received preferential loans from these banks. However, few Iraqis had bank deposits 
because of fear of seizure (Greimel, 2003). In short, a whole new financial system will have to be created 
as part of the early reconstruction effort. 
Initial Steps towards Reconstruction 
At the end of the war, work on these problems began across a wide set of fronts:  
1. One of the key missions of the U.S. Treasury department's advance team in Iraq has been to gather 
basic information (Davis and Pope, 2003) about economic conditions in the country so that officials in 
Washington can make intelligent decisions about the best path to take towards alleviating bottlenecks and 
encouraging private participation. This fact-finding draws on Treasury expertise gained in assessing the 
prospects of many of the former Soviet economies at the time of their independence. 
2. Immediate tasks include paying government salaries, determining the dinar's value, and establishing 
U.S. oversight of Iraq's central bank, Finance Ministry and other key agencies. 
3. Concurrently, officials in Washington and perhaps the United Nations are expected to take initial steps 
to restore oil production, launch public works projects, mobilize donors, seek debt relief, stabilize the 
currency, cover balance-of-payments shortfalls, provide investment safeguards and help draft a 
government budget. 
4. Although vague at this time (Duncan 2003), the international community is also expected to encourage 
the new government of Iraq to pursue ambitious longer-term reforms, such as modernizing commercial 
banking, reforming, the tax system, lowering tariffs and other trade restrictions, soliciting foreign 
investment, pursuing industrial diversification and privatizing government-run industries. 
Currency Instability 
An immediate concern has been the country's chaotic currency situation. After the Gulf War, Iraq replaced 
the old "Swiss" dinars (as they were known because they were printed in Switzerland) with "Saddam" 
dinars, and then printed ever larger quantities to make up for the government's chronic budget shortfalls. 
Though the government maintained the official exchange rate of Saddam dinars at 0.3 to the dollar, the 
black market exchange rate reached 2,000 to the dollar by the time Coalition Forces attacked Iraq. By the 
end of April 2003, their value is around 3,000 to the dollar. 
Although not printed since 1990, the older, "Swiss" dinars continue to circulate in the autonomous Kurdish 
regions of northern Iraq. Most are ragged, sometimes held together with tape, and there is no central 
bank that controls their supply—they simply re-circulate in the regions (Andrews, 2003). Through March 
2003 and into early April of this year, speculative buying had doubled the dollar value of these "Swiss" 
dinars. 
U.S. Treasury officials are in the process of assessing the possibilities for printing new batches of the 
Swiss dinars in either Iraq or abroad. Although Iraq did have printing and engraving plants, officials say 
they do not yet know how many of them are still functional or whether they can produce bills with modern 
anti-counterfeiting features like holograms (Andrews, 2003). 
Until a new system is established, the dollar will also be an "official" currency. The dollar has circulated 
widely in Iraq for years. By some estimates, Treasury officials say, as much as $500 million may have 
been circulating before the war. Small denomination dollars notes will be put into circulation through 
"emergency" payments to hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civil servants in an effort to quiet civic unrest 
and to stabilize the economy (Associated Press, 2003). 
American officials are working with finance and postal ministry officials from Saddam Hussein's 
government to figure out appropriate wages. Under the Hussein regime, the central government tightly 
controlled wages and prices. Setting wages too high could worsen inflation that is already running at 
about 70% annually. At first, the Iraqi workers will be given $20 each in $1 and $5 bills. That is a large 
sum in Iraq, where a midlevel oil professional with a chemical degree used to make the equivalent of $50 
a month.  
Also with no central bank or functional commercial banking system, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development will begin offering loans of between $100 and $250,000 to individual entrepreneurs and to 
small to medium-sized businesses. 
With no central bank or economic mechanisms to control the volume of dollars in circulation however, 
there is no assurance that inflation can be curbed, or resources allocated efficiently. Clearly, a top priority 
in reconstruction will have to be the establishment of a central bank that can oversee the country's 
monetary and financial system. 
Possible Exchange Rate Regimes for Iraq 
With the establishment of a central bank, the first issue at hand is whether it should immediately begin to 
issue its own currency. If it does, what are the policy options available? Which are superior? While a 
whole spectrum of flexible exchange rate systems are possible—managed flexible rates, gliding bands, 
adjustable pegs, etc.—given the dearth of financial and administrative expertise to properly manage a 
flexible rate system this option can be immediately ruled out as providing the stability needed over the 
next decade or so for reconstruction, though they are certainly realistic alternatives after the country has 
developed a sound financial system and is integrated into the global economy. Given this reality, the 
discussion below will be confined to the relative advantages and disadvantages of possible fixed rate 
systems. 
Currency Union: If Iraq opted for this option, a foreign currency would act as legal tender. Monetary 
policy would simply be delegated to the anchor (country of currency origin); the currency that circulates 
domestically would be literally the same as that circulating in one of the major economies, probably the 
dollar or possibly the euro.  
The motivation underlying this choice would be to get the maximum credibility for inflation-resistant 
monetary policy. Clearly maximum credibility derives from the fact that the country simply did not have a 
monetary policy because it lacked a currency to print. In technical terms it would largely eliminate the 
occurrence of a phenomenon that economists have dubbed the "time-inconsistency problem"—the fact 
that a government's incentive today to keep inflation low does not mean that a government will have the 
same incentive tomorrow. For example, one of the new political parties in Iraq may be elected on the 
promise that it will reduce inflation. After a few years in office, but before the next election, the party may 
begin to reconsider its original position. It will realize that it can probably gain additional political support if 
it increases the money supply to pay for extra social programs without directly taxing citizens. Moreover, 
inflation will not become apparent until after the elections.  
The problem for the government is that over time people are not stupid. After the first bout of inflation, 
individuals will anticipate from the start the government's incentive to inflate before its term is over—the 
voters may never lower their inflation expectations. The problem is compounded when the government in 
power today may not be the government in power tomorrow. Consequently, any anti-inflation statements 
that a political party makes will not be believed. This is the essence of the time-inconsistency problem 
and why governments, in order to create a credible anti-inflation policy, may want to have an independent 
central bank that does not have the same incentives to inflate as do elected members of government. An 
independent central bank (or in this case the lack of a central bank) can make it more difficult if not 
impossible for current and future governments to change course on monetary policy.  
Use of another country's currency would not be without its own set of problems. These fall in three main 
categories.  
First, the optimal currency area literature suggests that real shocks (for example terms of trade shocks) 
are better accommodated through flexible exchange rates, and nominal shocks (for example money 
demand shocks) through fixed exchange rates. Iraq would no doubt experience greater external than 
internal shocks during most of the reconstruction process. Because the country has virtually no money 
markets, fluctuations in oil revenues would be buffeted by movements in the country's real exchange rate, 
if it had its own currency. Using the dollar, however, would force these adjustments on the domestic 
economy—less output, more unemployment.  
Domestic economic contractions of this sort would be especially the case if Iraq's economy was not in the 
same phase of the business cycle as that of the country of currency origin. For example, a dramatic fall in 
oil prices would stimulate output and production in the United States perhaps to the point where monetary 
policy tightened to choke off excess demand. The subsequent increase in Iraqi interest rates would only 
accentuate the drop in aggregate demand in that country, thus compounding the severity of the oil price 
drop 
Warner (2003) sums up this aspect of possible dollarization in Iraq: 
The supply of dollars would be determined by the U.S., the interest rates would be determined by the 
U.S., and in effect Iraq's capacity to borrow would be determined by the U.S. It scarcely needs saying that 
what might be important to Iraq would not merit so much a mention at the monthly meetings of the 
Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee to determine monetary policy. The Cincinnati Cat Fish 
Company would get a better look than Iraq. 
Second, there would be no seignorage revenues—the difference between the cost of printing money and 
the non-inflationary value of goods and services the authorities could purchase with the newly issued 
money. This can be a fairly sizeable amount. Studies have shown that this is likely to be at least twice the 
country's pre-dollarization monetary base (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2000), or in Iraq's case millions and 
millions of dollars over time. However, under the circumstance the authorities might be able to negotiate a 
seignorage sharing agreement with the United States whereby the U.S. compensated Iraq for its lost 
income. 
Third, Iraq would lack the lender of last resort function—the ability of the central bank to discount 
commercial bank paper would be lost. In difficult times, commercial banks would not be able to build up 
their reserves by selling their assets at stable values to the central bank. Depending on its holdings of 
dollars/euros the fiscal authority (Ministry of Finance for example) might be able to perform the lender of 
last resort function, but this would not be assured. In short dollarization does not necessarily imply the 
loss of a lender of last resort, but simply the disappearance of one particular source of liquidity, namely 
central bank credit. 
In sum, dollarization (or eurozation) would have the chief advantage of providing a stable monetary 
environment for the country to recover. The system would place few demands on the country's monetary 
authorities, allowing the central bank breathing space to upgrade its staff to the point (in a decade or so) 
where more sophisticated monetary management would be feasible. There would be costs, perhaps the 
highest being the political/psychological one of appearing to be a colony of the United States. This alone 
might rule out dollarization. 
Currency Board: Under this system, Iraq would have its own "currency". But it would be constrained in 
managing that currency: (a) the dollar/"dinar" exchange rate would be fixed not just by policy, but by law; 
(b) a reserve requirement stipulating that each dollar/euro's worth of domestic currency is backed by a 
dollar/euro's worth of foreign reserves; and (c) a self-correcting balance of payments mechanism, in 
which a payments deficit automatically contracts the money supply, resulting in a contraction of spending. 
Like dollarization, a currency board can help to create a credible policy environment by removing from the 
monetary authorities the option of printing money to finance government deficits. 
The first currency board was established by the British in Mauritius in 1849. The use of currency boards 
eventually spread to 70 British colonies. The purpose was to provide the colonies with a stable currency 
without the associated difficulty of issuing sterling notes and coins that were costly to replace if lost or 
destroyed. The colonies also benefited from this approach in that they could earn interest on the foreign 
currency assets being held in reserve. The use of currency boards peaked in the 1940s and declined 
thereafter. In the 1960s many newly independent African countries replaced their currency board with a 
central bank, and most other countries followed suit in the 1970s. 
There is certainly precedent for this type of system in Iraq and in fact historically Iraq has used a system 
similar to that adopted by many of the former British colonies. When Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire, 
a number of European currencies circulated alongside the Turkish pound. With the establishment of the 
British mandate after World War I, Iraq was incorporated into the Indian monetary system, which was 
operated by the British, and the rupee became the principal currency in circulation.  
In 1931, the Iraq Currency Board was established in London for note issue and maintenance of reserves 
for the new Iraqi dinar. The currency board pursued a conservative monetary policy, maintaining very 
high reserves behind the dinar. The dinar was further strengthened by its link to the British pound. In 1947 
the government-owned National Bank of Iraq was founded, and in 1949 the London-based currency 
board was abolished as the new bank assumed responsibility for the issuing of notes and the 
maintenance of reserves. The National Bank of Iraq continued the currency board's conservative 
monetary policy, maintaining 100 percent reserves behind outstanding domestic currency.  
In more recent times, another Gulf country, the UAE, had considerable success with a currency board. 
This board was established in 1973 mainly for issuing the national currency, the Dirham, and defending 
its parity (which was set at 0.186621 grams of gold, and in terms of U.S. dollars it was 3.94737 Dirhams 
for one U.S. dollar, with a margin of fluctuation of plus or minus one percent).  
Prior to the creation of the Currency Board, and from the time the Trucial States abandoned the Indian 
Gulf rupee in 1966, various regional currencies such as the Bahraini dinar and the Saiudi and 
Qatari/Dubai riyals had served as local currencies in one emirate or another. The board was given the 
authority not only to issue a common currency for the union, but also to exercise central banking functions 
over the commercial and banking sector (Khalifa, 1979, p. 63). As with the case of Iraq noted above the 
currency board was eventually fazed out for a more traditional central bank with the power to issue its 
own money, not necessarily backed up by foreign assets. 
The introduction of currency board-like arrangements in Hong Kong (1983), Argentina (1991), Estonia 
(1992), Lithuania (1994), Bulgaria (1997), Bosnia (1998), Ecuador (2000) and El Salvador (2001) 
constitutes their resurgence in recent years. Clearly, however, the Argentine experience has forced a 
closer examination of the usefulness of this system. However, Hanke (2003) has noted that the main 
problem in Argentina was that the system was a "currency board-like" system and not a true currency 
board. 
Currency boards are not a panacea, and while one could produce the stability required for Iraqi 
reconstruction it would unlikely succeed indefinitely without reforms to increase competitiveness. This was 
Argentina's downfall. Thus after an impressive start, the Argentine government failed to liberalize trade 
enough to sufficiently expand exports. They failed to change restrictive labor laws. They raised taxes 
above U.S. levels. The result was that Argentina was not enough of a contender to withstand external 
shocks, or count on future investor confidence (Schlaes, 2002). 
The main advantage of the Currency Board over the Currency Union is largely that of political/national 
pride. However, on the assumption that over time the country's economic institutions develop and mature, 
the currency board might be a good transition to a more flexible exchange rate system more under control 
of the Iraqi authorities. Also on the plus side, the time inconsistency problem noted above would be 
reduced, but now subject to the perceived probability that the Board might be abandoned. As with the 
Currency Union, real exchange rate volatility would be diminished.  
Monetary Union: A monetary union for Iraq would entail accepting a common currency issued by a 
common regional central bank. Presently, there are no current regional unions of this sort Iraq might join, 
although the GCC countries are in the process of forming a currency union—the completion date of which 
is tentatively set for 2010—too far in the future to be of assistance for the country's reconstruction. In any 
case, Iraq's membership in the GCC monetary union is quite problematical at this point. Iraq's population 
is considerably larger than that of any of the GCC countries, implying that that country might have 
considerable advantages in industrialization, thus being a threat to several existing GCC members, 
notably Saudi Arabia. 
The benefits of a monetary union are similar to the first two systems examined above. It would also 
reduce the time inconsistency problem by requiring multinational agreement on policy. Real exchange 
rate volatility would also probably be reduced. For both, however, the result would be less certain than in 
the case of dollarization or a classic currency board. It would have all of the disadvantages associated 
with both systems. 
Traditional Peg: This system would entail setting a fixed rate between the new Iraqi currency and either 
the dollar or the euro (or some index weighted by the two). The potential benefit is that the time 
inconsistency problem would be reduced through commitment to a verifiable target. The system is more 
flexible than the currency board in that a devaluation option would always be open, thus providing a 
potentially valuable policy tool in response to large shocks. The system would also reduce real exchange 
rate volatility. However, the ability to periodically change the exchange rate is also the system's most 
serious limitation, with the possibility of instability stemming from investor speculation over possible rate 
changes. 
In addition, because the system would relax the fiscal constraint on the government expenditures (the 
dinar would no longer have a one-to-one backing of dollar/euro reserves), inflationary pressures might 
develop. In turn, these could lead to the so-called Dutch Disease effect (Looney, 1989), characterized by 
an overvalued foreign exchange rate limiting the ability of the country to develop broad based 
diversification into export markets. Through cheapening imports, the exchange rate would also limit 
import substitution industrialization for the large domestic market.  
Finally, because of the increased uncertainty surrounding possible devaluations, the exchange rate would, 
from time-to-time become a target for speculative attacks, especially during periods of low reserves and 
or high external debt servicing commitments. In short the pegged rate would avoid real exchange rate 
volatility, but not necessarily persistent misalignments. The approach does not by itself place hard 
constraints on monetary and fiscal policy and thus provides only a partial solution against the time 
inconsistency problem. The credibility effects depend on accompanying institutional measures and the 
record of accomplishment. Here the authorities could gain considerable credence by introducing and 
successfully managing a oil revenue stabilization fund. Proper management of the fund would smooth out 
oil expenditures leading to reduced inflationary pressures and exchange rate issues: doubts about 
sustainability in the presence of full capital mobility. 
Conclusions 
The main considerations concerning possible monetary and exchange rate systems in Iraq are 
summarized in Figure 1. Considering the current disarray of the Iraqi economy, dollarization is likely to be 
the best system to initiate in the country. This system would provide stability while providing limited 
demands on the country's central bank and money managers.  
No doubt, the political sensitivities of a new Iraqi government will soon dictate the initiation of a new Iraqi 
currency. Here, the currency board option appears to be the best currency/exchange rate alternative. The 
system would provide the country with price stability. It would also be consistent with the economy's 
gradual liberalization and integration into the world economy. Most importantly, such a system would also 
restore foreign confidence in the country's ability to provide a stable environment for investment. However, 
a currency board would probably not be optimal in the longer-term.  
A country of Iraq's economic size will eventually grow to the point where a more flexible system would 
provide a better tool for macroeconomic management of the domestic economy. Still, the board would 
provide the Iraqi authorities with some breathing space until a new central bank had gathered the 
experience and expertise to introduce a more complex, flexible exchange rate system. At that point the 
country could move to a fixed exchange rate, linking the Iraqi dinar to the dollar/euro or some basket of 
the two.  
To avoid an overvaluation of the dinar and possible Dutch Disease effects (Ebrahim-Zadeh, 2003), the 
country should simultaneously have a fiscal policy built around an oil stabilization fund (Barnett and 
Ossowski, 2003). In turn, the fund would be designed to smooth out as much as feasible fluctuations in oil 
revenues. Over time, successful management of the fund could contribute to the stability of the exchange 
rate and thus the country's completion of the reconstruction and restructuring of its economy. 
  
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Middle East Resources  
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